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The distinctive character of Québec’s civil law does not need to
be demonstrated once again. Its unique chronotope, 1 its
recodification, and its lifelong vie commune with the common law 2
are all factors that have been brilliantly examined 3 and will be
taken for granted in this text. What is at stake—and surely all of
these unique factors will be brought out during this study—is
simply the peculiar nature of one of its institutions: partnership.
Québec’s partnership has, without a doubt, a certain je ne sais
quoi that might be of interest to others struggling with this juridical
notion and its effects. Indeed, the histories of partnership in the
* PhD student, Université Laval; Joseph-Armand Bombardier CGS
Doctoral Scholar; Wainwright Junior Fellow, McGill University; Researcher,
Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law; Member of the
Barreau du Québec. I would like to thank Olivier Moréteau for his invitation, his
patience and constructive comments. I am also grateful to all of my colleagues at
the Crépeau Centre, especially to Natasha Perri for her invaluable assistance.
1. This term is used by the language philosopher, Mikhail Bakhtin, to
express the way time and space are inscribed in language. See Mikhail Bakhtin,
Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel, in THE DIALOGIC
IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 84 (University of Texas Press 1981).
2. For an analysis of this proximity and a take on “société distincte”
understood as a distinctive society, see Patrice Garant, Code civil du Québec,
Code de procédure civile et société distincte, 37 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 141
(1996).
3. John E.C. Brierley, The Renewal of Québec’s Distinct Legal Culture:
The New Civil Code of Québec, 42 U. TORONTO L. J. 484 (1992).
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civil law as well as in the common law have revealed a fascinating
ambivalence about the nature of the institution, an institution that,
even if it can be said to have existed forever, never found its
grounding and still oscillates between legal personality, a modality
of ownership and a mere contractual relationship.
In Québec, the legislature was thought, until recently, to have
taken a stance. After ambiguity remained under the Civil Code of
Lower Canada, 4 and after it was recommended that partnerships
should be granted legal personality, 5 it was clearly stated that a
partnership is not a legal person under the current Civil Code of
Québec. 6 Indeed, the Civil Code of Québec defines partnership, in
French “société,” as a contract akin to what is understood as a
partnership elsewhere in Canada. In doing so, the presumption
seemed clear: the importance was placed on the relationship
between the partners who, together, were the owners of the
combined property held in some joint undivided manner and thus
were solidarily liable for its debts.
Yet, recent developments have shed new light on this
presumption: in Ferme CGR enr, senc., 7 the Québec Court of
Appeal held that it was not necessary for the partners of a Québec
general partnership to be placed in bankruptcy for the partnership
itself to go bankrupt. Analyzing partnership as a distinct and
autonomous patrimony, the Court modified—or at least bespoke—
the presumed ownership structure of partnerships in Québec,
making it difficult to contend, with any certainty, that partners are
the owners of the combined property and thus personally
responsible for its debts.

4. See Québec (ville de) c Compagnie d’immeubles Allard ltée [1996]
R.J.Q. 1566.
5. Civil Code Revision Office, Committee on the Contract of Partnership,
Report on the Contract of Partnership, XXIV, (1974). See
http://digital.library.mcgill.ca/ccro for further reference.
6. See art. 2186 and 2188 Civil Code of Québec [hereinafter CCQ].
7. Ferme CGR enr., s.e.n.c. (Syndic de) 2010 Q.C.C.A. 719.
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Thus, the question now is very simple: who owns a Québec
partnership? 8 This question is important. At stake is not only the
juridical nature of partnership in Québec, but also what is
understood as personality, patrimony and, ultimately, civil liability
in this mixed jurisdiction. One must recall that personality has lost
its primacy in Québec as the possibility of patrimony by
appropriation has come into force. Indeed, by choosing patrimony
by appropriation as the vehicle to recast the trust in the Civil Code
of Québec, 9 the legislature has not only changed the framework of
the trust as understood in the Civil Code of Lower Canada, it
literally changed the overall juridical plan: patrimonial rights today
have two means of being in the Civil Code of Québec: they either
belong to persons, or they are appropriated to a purpose. 10 This
transformation is fundamental, and has the power of transforming
old stories into completely new ones. In our case, the prospect of
patrimony by appropriation has clearly created a new angle within
the old debate about partnership: the question is not only if a
partnership has a distinct legal personality from its partners; now a
partnership can be understood as not having legal personality, yet
as having a distinct patrimony containing rights and obligations of
its own. 11
The questions then become: What is a distinct patrimony? Is it
the same thing as a patrimony by appropriation? Is it the right
vehicle for civil law partnerships? What distinguishes patrimony
from legal personality? Can there be liability without personality
or even without patrimony? Why are we having so much trouble
defining such an old institution? What is really at stake here?

8. Martin Boodman, Who owns a Québec partnership?, 5 BUSINESS LAW
QUARTERLY—MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT (November 29, 2010), available at
www.mccarthy.ca/article_detail.aspx?id=5201.
9. See Title 6, “Certain patrimonies by appropriation,” art. 1256 et seq.
CCQ.
10. Article 915 CCQ.
11. Ferme CGR , supra note 7, para. 70.
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This text has two principal aims: first, to give an overview of
the debate concerning the nature of general partnerships in
Québec; second, to use this debate in order to better understand the
key concepts at play and their role in Québec’s civilian
imagination today.
The text will unfold in four parts. I will first examine the roots
of the notion and its iteration in the common and civil law. I will
then turn to Québec and give a brief overview of the debate
surrounding the nature of partnership since its first codification. At
that point, I will examine the law in force today, and its
jurisprudential interpretation, which understands partnership as a
distinct and autonomous patrimony, in order to finally go back to
the basics and to examine what a partnership is in Québec and
what makes Québec law so distinctive.
I. SOCIETAS, PARTNERSHIPS & SOCIÉTÉS
Partnerships have been around. Roman law knew this form of
organization which grew out of the need—should we say universal
need—to bring resources together to achieve a certain goal. The
nature of the Roman societas is still under scrutiny today. Some
scholars think about it in terms of civil status, others in pure
contractual form. 12 Both ways have repercussions for our
understanding of the institution today, because both are about the
capacity bestowed upon a partner in regard to the collective
property, in regard to the other partners and in regard to third
parties.
The contractual nature of the societas seems to be agreed upon
for common law as well as for civil law. 13 Here is a recent
description of the Roman institution:
12. David Daube, Societas as Consensual Contract, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 381
(1936-1938).
13. On the shift from status to contract see HENRY MAINE, THE ANCIENT
LAW, ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS
RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (John Murray, 1861).
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Roman partnership was a contract based on the agreement
of two or more parties who cooperated to reach a common
aim. Partners contributed all their goods, money or labour
to the company. They brought to the partnership single
goods or specific activities and they sought a profit, in
proportions which could vary from one partner to another.
According to Gaius:
3.148: Societatem coire solemus aut totorum bonorum aut
unius negotii, veluti mancipiorum emendorum aut
vendendorum. Partnership usually covers either all the
partners' wordly [sic] wealth or else a single business, for
instance, buying and selling slaves.
The share of profits and losses among partners is “inside”
the contract and it arises from the obligations among the
partners themselves, regulated by the actio pro socio, a civil
action based on bona fides. However the partnership was
“personale,” that is among people. The personal nature of
the partnership obligations are evidenced by the fact that a
partner could not convey—either by a contract inter vivos
(among living people) nor mortis causa (by hereditary
succession)—his membership to other people without all
the partners' consent. In that case a “new” partnership
would arise, both substantially and legally. . . . 14
The law of societas, as described here, organized the relations
of the partners amongst themselves. The contract was intuitu
personae and if a partner disappeared, the partnership collapsed.15
Partnership was a membership, a relationship, a way of being with
one another regulated by a contract.
The common law today still understands partnership as a mere
relationship: “Partnership is the relation that subsists between
persons carrying on a business in common with a view to profit.”16
14. Salvo Randazzo, The Nature of Partnership in Roman Law, 9 AUSTL. J.
LEGAL. HIST. 119, 120 (2005).
15. RAYMOND SALEILLES, DE LA PERSONNALITÉ JURIDIQUE - HISTOIRE ET
THÉORIES 47 (2d ed., Rousseau 1922), available at http://droit.wester.ouisse.
free.fr/pages/brocantes/saleilles_personnes/sal_pers_1_S.htm.
16. See s. 2, Partnerships Act, RSO 1990, c P.5. In Canada, statutory
regulation of partnerships falls under provincial jurisdiction and the Partnership
Acts in the common law provinces are essentially an adaptation of the United
Kingdom’s 1890 Partnership Act. Although reforms and law commissions have
taken place in the United States and United Kingdom, Canada still understands
partnership as an aggregate of persons.
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What distinguishes societas from common law partnership today is
mainly this idea of business. Presently, partnership is understood
as a commercial enterprise and its first aim is profit. Yet, and this
is where a big part of the confusion stems from, when we read,
hear, and think of a partnership, we do not think of a relationship, a
way of being with one another, we think of the firm, the actual
business. Thus, when we talk about the partnership property, it
seems as if the partnership is a distinct entity able to hold property.
This is misleading. A partnership is not a distinct and autonomous
entity as a corporation is. When we talk about a partnership, we
must consider all the partners. They carry out the business. They
own the partnership property, which is typically held in common.
They are personally liable. We should not say “the partnership
property” but always “the property held in partnership” or “the
property appropriated to the firm,” “the business.” Partnership is a
way of being, not a being. Partnership in the common law is an
aggregate of partners; 17 it is not a legal person.
In the civil law, in France more precisely, the distinctions
between a société and a legal person, between a way of being and a
being, have been blurred. 18 The story of the French muddling is
worth revealing. It pertains to the way civil law understands
collective interests and the legal capacity conferred upon a group
of persons. And, it has to do, yet again, with the power of
metonymic language: the linguistic reification of the partnership—
société de personnes—as an entity able to hold property and be
liable on its own, has had an enormous influence on French, and
thus Québec, legal minds throughout the years.

17. The debate in the common law over entity or aggregate status of
partnership is not new. See, e.g., Joseph H. Drake, Partnership Entity and
Tenancy in Partnership: The Struggle for Definition, 15 MICH. L. REV. 609
(1917).
18. Not true for all civil law jurisdictions, see TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOCIATION
HENRI CAPITANT, LES GROUPEMENTS ET LES ORGANISMES SANS PERSONNALITÉ
JURIDIQUE (vol. 21, Dalloz 1974).
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The distinction between a société and a legal person was
relatively clear until the 19th century. The société resembled the
common law partnership taking its roots, as the word itself
denotes, in the societas. It was thus a relationship, an aggregation
of persons, like the one previously mentioned. It had no legal
personality, no patrimony, no legal capacity of its own. If one
partner disappeared, the relationship disappeared. The individuals,
together, were owners, debtors and beneficiaries. The life of their
association depended upon them. It was a mere contractual
agreement, a purely private matter, a way of being together for a
particular purpose.
Legal persons were not so private. They required state
intervention and they took shape around the roman idea of
universitas. A universitas, a notion that developed slightly later in
the Roman imagination, had, contrary to a societas, something akin
to legal capacity. With universitas, the idea was to create an entity
that could endure, an autonomous body—corps—independent
from its actual members, who could change and even be reduced to
one. Thus, a corporation, as opposed to a partnership, had legal
personality, held property personally and thus was personally
liable for its own debts. 19 A corporation was a being.
Until the French revolution, the dichotomy in France between
partnership and corporation was clear, as it was in other
jurisdictions like England and Germany. General partnerships had
no legal capacity and took the shape of a kind of collective
ownership organized around a contractual private agreement

19. It was mainly around the idea of universitas that the notion of legal
person—personne morale—started taking shape. Raymond Saleilles, the French
specialist on the topic of legal personality, described universitas in the following
way: “L’Universitas . . . apparait comme un sujet de droit se détachant
désormais de la personnalité des individus qui en sont les parties composites.”
See SALEILLES, supra note 15, at 78, 87, 89, 90.
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between the partners. 20 Corporations, on the other hand, were legal
persons and could only arise by royal assent. 21
However, following the enactment of the French Civil Code, a
bizarre phenomenon 22 was observed in France: legal personality
was granted to partnerships while other forms of aggregation,
which had previously had legal personality, for example
foundations, were deprived of it. 23 This shift occurred first for
commercial partnerships in the Commercial Code, and was
promptly followed by a decision by the Cour de cassation which
declared that civil partnerships had legal personality and,
consequently, their own patrimony. 24 One of the grounds for
granting legal personality to partnerships is worth mentioning
because it was primarily textual: according to the court, since the
Code often referred to partnerships as debtors or creditors, this
indicated that the legislature wanted implicitly to grant personality
to partnerships. This is important, as a long debate concerning the
source of legal personality had animated the law at the time. There
were two schools of thought: the fiction theory, according to which
legal personality was only granted expressly by law to entities; and
the realist theory, according to which legal personality existed only
under certain conditions, as if there was a natural right to legal
personality. Here both schools of thought wanted to seize the
ruling as an application of their understanding of what ought to be.
20. Id. at 297.
21. The state wanted to have a say or, more precisely, a hold on these
fictional persons which, because of their capacity, accumulated wealth and
became a threat. On the history of legal personality see Madeleine CantinCumyn, La personne morale dans le droit privé de la province de Québec, in
CONTEMPORARY LAW, DROIT CONTEMPORAIN 44-59 (Institute of Comparative
Law, McGill University, Yvon Blais 1992).
22. These are the words of SALEILLES, supra note 15, at 300.
23. Maitland described the paradox: “Recent writers have noticed it as a
paradox that the State saw no harm in the selfish people who wanted dividends,
while it had an intense dread of the comparatively unselfish people who would
combine with some religious, charitable, literary, scientific, artistic purpose in
view.” FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 67
(Cambridge University Press 2003).
24. Cass. Req., 23 February 1891, D.P. 1891, I. 337.
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Yet, it seems that what happened was more something in between:
an implicit attribution of legal personality by the legislator.
Partnership was understood to be a legal person simply because of
the hesitant language of the Code.
Today the French law is clear: partnerships in France are, once
registered, legal persons by law. The fiction theory prevailed: 25
French sociétés are beings.
II. PARTNERSHIPS IN QUÉBEC
The ambivalent nature of the Québec partnership stems from
its ambiguous relationship with both the common law and French
civil law as well as from its own particular history of codification
and recodification. 26
The story is as follows: Under the Civil Code of Lower
Canada, a general partnership was a contract, 27 but it was
understood by the majority of Québec scholars 28 and judges 29 as a
25. It was only in 1978 that this was truly clarified in the French Civil Code,
which states that a partnership has legal personality once it has been registered:
see art. 1842 of the French Civil Code, amended by Law no. 78-9 of January 4,
1978.
26. For a good overview of the story of the new Québec code, see the welldocumented, if a bit arrogant, text of Pierre Legrand, Bureaucrats at Play: The
New Québec Civil Code, 10 BRIT. J. OF CAN. STUD. 52 (1995).
27. Article 1830 Civil Code of Lower Canada: “It is essential to the contract
of partnership that it should be for the common profit of the partners, each of
whom must contribute to it property, credit, skill, or industry.” (“Il est de
l'essence du contrat de société qu'elle soit pour le bénéfice commun des associés
et que chacun d'eux y contribue en y apportant des biens, son crédit, son
habileté ou son industrie”).
28. PIERRE-BASILE MIGNAULT, 8 LE DROIT CIVIL CANADIEN 186 (Wilson &
Lafleur 1909); ANTONIO PERRAULT, 2 TRAITÉ DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 433 (A.
Lévesque ed., 1936); HERVÉ ROCH & RODOLPHE PARÉ, 13 TRAITÉ DE DROIT
CIVIL DU QUÉBEC 339 (Wilson & Lafleur 1957); NICOLE L'HEUREUX, PRÉCIS DE
DROIT COMMERCIAL DU QUÉBEC 162 (2d ed., PUL 1975); J. Smith, La
personnalité morale des groupements non constitués en corporation, 81 R. DU
N. 457, 462 (1979); ALBERT BOHÉMIER & PIERRE P. CÔTÉ, 2 DROIT
COMMERCIAL GÉNÉRAL 20 (3d ed., Thémis 1986); Charlaine Bouchard, La
réforme du droit des sociétés: l'exemple de la personnalité morale, 34 C. DE D.
349, 374-75 (1993). Contra, see Yves Caron, Les associations et les
groupements dépourvus de personnalité juridique en droit civil et
commercial québécois, in T RAVAUX DE L 'ASSOCIATION H ENRI C APITANT ,
supra note 18, at 181; J. Smith, La personnalité morale des groupements
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legal person or an “imperfect legal person.” 30 It was only in 1996,
two years after the coming into force of the new Civil Code of
Québec, that the Québec Court of Appeal clarified the notion
found in the Civil Code of Lower Canada, although it was already
outdated by this time. In Allard, the Court, for the first time, stated
clearly that a general partnership under the Civil Code of Lower
Canada was not a legal person and, consequently, that it could not
have a personal patrimony: “. . . la société civile ne constitue pas
une personne juridique distincte de ses membres, et . . . , même si
la société peut paraître posséder certains des attributs de la
personnalité juridique, elle ne jouit pas de la propriété d'un
patrimoine distinct de celui de ses associés.” 31
What is paradoxical here is that this 1996 judgment came about
after extensive debates on the nature of partnership had already
been settled by the legislature in the new Civil Code of Québec. As
mentioned in the introduction, the Civil Code Revision Office had
at the time recommended giving legal personality to partnerships
in Québec. 32 Yet, the legislature rejected this proposal and kept the
notion as a contract and a private matter regulated by the Civil
Code. In the Civil Code of Québec, partnership is placed among
the nominate contracts and is now defined along these lines:
“Article 2186. A contract of partnership is a contract by which the

non constitués en corporation, 81 R. DU N. 457 (1978-79); J. Smith, Le
contrat de société en droit québécois, 83 R. DU N. 123 (1979-80).
29. See, e.g., the following judgments : Crépeau c. Boisvert (1898), 13 C.S.
405 (C. de R.); Wemyss c. Poulin (1934), 57 B.R. 514; Garneau c. Drapeau
(1939), 77 C.S. 350; Gareau c. Laboissière, [1949] C.S. 41; Reindolph c.
Harrison Bros. Ltd., [1949] R.L. 137 (C.S.); Noël c. Petites soeurs franciscaines
de Marie, [1967] C.S. 1; Sous-ministre du revenu du Québec c. Jobin, [1971]
C.S. 565; Caisse populaire Pontmain c. Couture, [1983] C.P. 149; Somec Inc. c.
P.G. du Québec (4 juin 1987), Québec 200-09-000496-858, J.E. 87-667 (C.A.);
Lalumière c. Moquin (24 avril 1995), Montréal 500-09-001726-934, J.E. 95-909
(C.A.); Menuiserie Denla Inc. c. Condo Jonquière Inc., J.E. 96-225 (C.A.).
30. For a good example of this last idea, see G. Demers, Considérations
sur la société commerciale et sur la rédaction du contrat de société, C.P.
DU N. 75 (1971).
31. Supra note 4.
32. Supra note 5.
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parties, in a spirit of cooperation, agree to carry on an activity,
including the operation of an enterprise, to contribute thereto by
combining property, knowledge or activities and to share any
resulting pecuniary profits.” 33
This 1991 definition keeps the two essential characteristics
established in article 1830 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada—
common profit and common contribution—and simply adds the
infamous affectio societatis. The new partnership is thus not so
new. 34 In reality, if partnerships under the Civil Code of Lower
Canada took on forms that are today forgotten—the distinction
between civil and commercial partnerships or between universal
and particular partnerships were not carried over—their very
nature is the same: a contract between partners.
In fact, the legislature, to make sure that there was no
confusion around this idea, specified this time around that only
partnerships that were joint-stock companies were legal persons,
implying that all the other types were evidently not: “Article 2188.
Partnerships are either general partnerships, limited partnerships or
undeclared partnerships. Partnerships may also be joint-stock
companies, in which case they are legal persons.” 35
33. Article 2186 QCC: “Le contrat de société est celui par lequel les parties
conviennent, dans un esprit de collaboration, d'exercer une activité, incluant
celle d'exploiter une entreprise, d'y contribuer par la mise en commun de biens,
de connaissances ou d'activités et de partager entre elles les bénéfices
pécuniaires qui en résultent.”
34. See MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE, 2 COMMENTAIRES DU MINISTRE DE LA
JUSTICE—LE CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC, UN MOUVEMENT DE SOCIÉTÉ (Les
Publications du Québec 1993), under art. 2186.
35. Article 2188 QCC (La société est en nom collectif, en commandite ou en
participation. Elle peut être aussi par actions; dans ce cas, elle est une personne
morale). The phrasing of the provision is worth emphasising, as it clearly states
that in some cases partnerships may be corporations and thus have legal
personality, and this is exactly why the distinction between the two has been
blurred or is at least ambivalent in contemporary Québec civil law. According to
the last sentence of this article, a partnership can—in some cases—be a legal
person. Yet, the reasoning behind its calling a joint stock company a partnership
may not be obvious to all. What is actually going on here is a bit strange and is
mainly rooted in the French text and in successive civil law and common law
translations over the years. As previously noted, in the French language and in
civil law of the French tradition, the word “société” has multiple legal meanings
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This was not an unmotivated provision. The commentaries of
the Minister of Justice at the time are clear:
. . . having failed to establish the subtle and difficult
distinction between “full-fledged” and “unfledged”
juridical personalities, between complete and incomplete
legal personality, the previous law was instead maintained.
Furthermore, the assignment of juridical personality to
partnerships would not provide any real benefits. Instead, it
would risk creating a disparity in treatment for Québec
partnerships when compared to partnerships founded
elsewhere in North America, which do not possess juridical
personality. This is in addition to the potential tax

and does not only mean “contract of partnership.” A société can have legal
personality. So, in France, writing “une société peut être une personne morale”
would not be wrong. In common law Canada, even if the distinction between
partnership and corporation is still well established, the word société has been
used in a very strange manner. For example, in the federal Business Corporation
Act, the term “corporation” was translated by the French term “compagnie,”
rather than by the French term “corporation,” and then, for reasons that seem to
be purely linguistic, the term “sociétés commerciales” (to resemble the language
of Québec law under the Civil Code of Lower Canada [hereinafter CCLC]). Yet,
if we look at article 1864 CCLC, we can see that “société commerciale,” in
English “commercial partnership,” had multiple meanings ranging from general
partnership to “société par actions” (joint-stock companies). Under the CCLC,
the word société thus embraced both entities encompassed by the terms
“corporation” and “partnership,” as if they both meant the same thing in the eyes
of the law. Translating “corporations” in Canada with “société
commerciales” might have felt more French, but it was legally a bit amphigoric,
if not perverse! A joint-stock company was a commercial partnership but not all
commercial partnerships were corporations! The use of the same word in French
in Québec and at the federal level introduced difficulty with respect to the
distinctions between the nature of the two institutions. Today, in
both Québec and at the federal level, the Business Corporations Acts are: Loi
canadienne sur les sociétés par actions L.R. (1985), ch. C-44, art. 1; 1994, ch.
24, art. 1(F) and Loi sur les sociétés par action S.Q., ch. S-31.1. Even if we are
clearly not talking in these cases about a société de personnes (a partnership),
the use of the word société is misleading. Someone somewhere forgot the
origins of the word and idea (societas) and incorporated (no pun intended) it
bizarrely into the law. With this looseness in the use of language, it is no wonder
that partnerships in Québec can be understood as having legal personality of
some kind: lost in this translation is the distinction between partnerships and
corporations, between a mere contractual agreement and legal personality. On
the difficulties encountered with the word corporation and the story of its
multiple translations (in French) in Canada, see Antoni Dandonneau, La
francisation à l’aveuglette du droit des ‘corporations,’ 13 R.J.T. 89 (1978), and
André Lavérière, Le droit des companies, 49 R. DU B. 851 (1989).
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consequences of such an assignment. 36
It was decided to keep partnership as a mere contractual
agreement for two mains reasons: first as a matter of continuity
with the old law; second, partnership elsewhere in North America
did not have legal personality.
Reading these provisions and commentary, the issue seems
settled: a general partnership in Québec today is a mere contract
and its regime can be found, like other nominate contracts, in Book
V of the Code. Yet, instead of settling the controversy, the Allard
judgment 37 only sparked a new discussion: since that judgment
was argued under the Civil Code of Lower Canada, it did not
resolve question under the Civil Code of Québec. A new debate
followed, taking the text of the new Code, and pushing the
question of the nature of partnerships a step further.
Between 1996 and today, the number of articles that have been
written on this matter has been fascinating, each of them taking a
different stance. In fact, in Québec scholarship, it seems that
almost every issue concerning the nature of partnerships and the
personal liability of the partners has been argued: some argued for
legal personality, 38 others for mere indivision, 39 some for a new

36. (Translated by the author) COMMENTAIRE DU MINISTRE, supra note 34,
under art. 2188:
. . . à défaut d'établir une difficile et subtile distinction entre la grande
et la petite personnalité juridique, entre la personnalité morale
complète et incomplète, a-t-on préféré maintenir ici le droit antérieur.
D'ailleurs, l'attribution de la personnalité juridique aux sociétés ne
comportait pas d'avantages réels particuliers, mais risquait, par
contre, de créer une disparité de traitement par rapport aux sociétés
constituées ailleurs en Amérique du Nord, qui ne sont pas dotées de la
personnalité juridique, sans compter les incidences fiscales possibles
d'une telle attribution.
37. Supra note 4.
38. Ruth Goldwater, La société civile est-elle une personne morale?, 34
THÉMIS 91 (1960), and also Charlaine Bouchard, La réforme du droit des
sociétés : l'exemple de la personnalité morale, 34 C. DE D., at. 349-394 (1993).
39. Charlaine Bouchard & Lucie Laflamme, La dérive de l’indivision vers
la société: quand l’indivision se conjugue avec la société, 30 R.D.U.S. 317, 333
(2000).

352

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

modality of ownership, 40 others for the long-forgotten collective
ownership. 41 The idea of distinct patrimony occupies a big share of
the landscape, 42 the new Code giving way to the new idea of
patrimony by appropriation. 43 What is fascinating is that the judges
seemed to be as indecisive as the scholars: some affirmed the
obvious lack of legal personality of partnerships under the Civil
Code of Québec, 44 while others hung on to the notion of indivision,
which was at the heart of the issue in Allard. 45 Other judges clearly
preferred the dissenting opinion in Allard 46 and reaffirmed the
legal personality of some partnerships. 47 Others, feeling that
something else was occurring, supported the idea that, in fact, a
distinct patrimony had been created. 48 In Laval (City of) v.
Polyclinique médicale de Fabreville, a 2007 case, the bench, which
40. Donald A. Riendeau, La « société » en droit québécois, R. DU B. 127
(2003).
41. Générosa Bras Miranda, La propriété collective. Est-ce grave, docteur?
– Réflexions à partir d’une relecture de l’arrêt Allard, 63 R. DU B. 29 (2003).
42. Michael Wilhelmson, The Nature of the Québec Partnership: Moral
Person, Organized Indivision or Autonomous Patrimony?, R.D. MCGILL 995
(1992).
43. Louise-Hélène Richard, L’autonomie patrimoniale de la société : le
patrimoine d’affectation, une avenue possible?, in SERVICE DE LA FORMATION
PERMANENTE DU BARREAU DU QUÉBEC, CONGRÈS ANNUEL DU BARREAU DU
QUÉBEC 149 (Éditions Yvon Blais 2002).
44. Lévesque c. Mutuelle-vie des fonctionnaires du Québec, [1996] R.J.Q.
1701; Caisse populaire Laurier c. 2959-6673 Québec Inc., C.S. Québec, no 20005-004938-960, 28 novembre 1996; Gingras c. Prud'homme, [1997] R.J.Q. 664;
Charron c. Drolet, J.E. 2005-916 (C.A.).
45. Gingras c. Prud'homme, [1997] R.J.Q. 664, 675; 9137-1096 Québec
Inc. c. Ville de Montréal, C.Q. Montreal, 2006 Q.C.C.Q. 5136.
46. See Justice Biron’s dissent in Allard, supra note 4:
Je ne puis me convaincre que dans les articles du Code civil du BasCanada où le législateur parle des biens de la société, des choses
appartenant à la société, des immeubles de la société, ‘the property of
the partnership,’ il ne donne pas aux mots et aux expressions leur sens
habituel. Je suis donc d'avis qu'une société peut être propriétaire de
biens.
47. 2964-7922 Québec Inc. (Syndic de), J.E. 99-15 (C.S.); Société en nom
collectif Vausko c. Ameublement et décoration Côté-Sud (St.-Denis) Inc., J.E.
99-2330 (C.S.); Groupe Kotler et al c. L'inspecteur général des institutions
financières, J.E. 2002-1429 (C.Q.); Dufour c. Savard, [1995] R.L. 327 (C.Q.).
48. Servomation International and Company Limited (Syndic de), J.E. 98203 (C.S.) (société en commandite); voir aussi Corporation des maîtres
électriciens du Québec c. Jodoin Électrique Inc. J.E. 2000-548 (C.S.); DuvalHesler c. Lalande, J.E. 97-8 (C.Q.).
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included Justice Brossard (who had written for the majority in
Allard) went as far as to say: “A limited partnership, like any other
partnership, has its own patrimony which, as long as it is sufficient,
is distinct from the patrimony of the persons who founded it.
Therefore, the limited partnership is its own entity, without being a
legal person within the meaning of the Act.” 49
This is the approach that seems to have been taken in the latest
judgment of interest, Ferme CGR. 50
III. THE JUDGMENT
The facts are quite simple. In July 2009, the Bank of Montreal
gave notice to Ferme CGR that it intended to enforce its securities
under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. 51 The trustee in
bankruptcy presented the partnership’s documents but the Official
Receiver refused to file the assignment on the ground that a
partnership may not assign its property in bankruptcy if its partners
do not do so as well. According to him, since partnerships were not
granted legal personality under the Civil Code of Québec, all
partners, as owners of the partnership’s property, were required to
assign their own property for the assignment to take place. He
grounded his position on the legal nature of partnerships in Québec
as well as on common law commentary and case law. 52 One must
keep in mind that bankruptcy is a federal matter. In this
49. (Translated by the author) Laval (Ville de) c. Polyclinique médicale
Fabreville, sec., 2007 Q.C.C.A. 426 (CanLII) at para. 24: “Une société en
commandite, comme toute autre société, a un patrimoine propre qui, tant qu'il
est suffisant, est distinct de celui des personnes dont elle est constituée; elle jouit
alors d'une entité propre, sans pour autant être une personne morale au sens de
la Loi.”
50. Supra note 7.
51. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act R.S.C. (1985), c. B-3 [hereinafter BIA].
52. E.g.: “An assignment executed by all the members of a partnership
carries with it all the assets of the partnership as well as the separate assets of the
partners.” Taylor v. Leveys (1922), 2 C.B.R. 390 (Ont. S.C.); Cohen v. Mahlin, 8
C.B.R. 23, [1927] 1 W.W.R. 162, 22 Alta. L.R. 487, [1927] 1 D.L.R. 577
(C.A.).” LLOYD W, HOULDEN, GEOFFREY B. MORAWETZ, & JANIS P. SARRA,
THE 2010 ANNOTATED BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT 199 (Thomson
Carswell 2010), D§51(5) and D§72(2)(b).

354

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

perspective, the officials administering the bankruptcy system
naturally favour an approach that aligns the approach in Québec
with that taken in the common law provinces.
The case appeared initially before a Superior Court judge. In a
very brief judgment, the judge acknowledged the problem, first
noting that the BIA did assimilate a general partnership to a person
in its definitional provisions, then observing that the case law
supported arguments on both sides. At that point, he concluded that
the remedy was in the creditors’ hands according to the BIA and
the Civil Code of Québec, and thus that the Official Receiver had
to respect their choice to pursue only the partnership.
The case was subsequently heard at the Québec Court of
Appeal. There, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy took over the
position first argued by his Official Receiver: a general partnership
does not have legal personality or, he added, a distinct patrimony.
Consequently, it cannot assign its property without assigning that
of its partners, to pursue the partnership is to pursue its partners.
The solvency test set out in the BIA is a collective one. Again, the
Superintendent‘s position was largely based on common law
commentary and case law as well as on the very nature of
partnership under the Civil Code of Québec. The trustee in
bankruptcy, for his part, dismissed the case law submitted by the
Superintendent as long repealed and, more importantly for us, as
inconsistent with the legal attributes given to general partnership in
the Civil Code of Québec. He argued that the Superintendent is
confusing “the notion of legal personality with the objectives of the
BIA, that is, with the orderly liquidation of a patrimony for the
benefit of the creditors." 53 What was at stake, according to him,

53. Ferme CGR, supra note 7, para. 15. (The translation of the judgment
used in this article is based on an unofficial English translation prepared by the
Société québécoise d'information juridique (SOQUIJ) which is an entity of the
Department of Justice of Québec. It is available at http://soquij.qc.ca/fr/servicesaux-citoyens/english-translation).
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was the liquidation of an “organized patrimony”, 54 regardless of
whether or not it possessed legal personality.
Thus, the debate at the level of the Court of Appeal shifted
slightly: the idea of the liquidation of an “organized patrimony”,
that is the liquidation of a personal patrimony or some other kind
of patrimony, was introduced, leaving aside the idea of ownership
and liability.
I will not perform an in-depth review of all the arguments
analyzed by the Court, as I want to focus on on the “patrimony’
issue.” To state the opinion briefly, Justice Rochon, writing for the
Court, endorsed the trustee’s point of view: the case law and
commentaries given by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy relied on
old statutes and ignored recent legislation, the most important one
for the case at bar being the Civil Code of Québec. 55 According to
Justice Rochon, the legal nature of a general partnership has
changed with the coming into force of the new Code.
Justice Rochon had no intention of reopening the Court’s
holding in Allard under the old Code. He had no intention of
dismissing the fact that the absence of legal personality has been
codified in the Civil Code of Québec at article 2188. But,
according to him, the stakes have now shifted: with the inclusion
of the patrimony by appropriation, or what he calls the objective
theory of patrimony, 56 in the Civil Code, the paradigm has
changed: “While providing that every person has a patrimony, the
CCQ acknowledges that a patrimony may be appropriated to a
purpose (articles 2 and 915 CCQ)." 57
Hence, a partnership would be, in fact, a separate entity with a
separate patrimony, albeit bereft of legal personality. According to
Justice Rochon, because the language of article 2199 of the Civil
Code acknowledges that the contribution of the partners to the
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. para. 15.
Id. para. 41.
Id. para. 66.
Id. para. 66 (footnotes omitted).
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partnership occurs through a property transfer from the partners to
the partnership, there cannot be any doubt that partnerships have
their own patrimonies: “It would be impossible,” he underlines,
“not to acknowledge the clearly expressed legislative will to create,
through that property transfer, a patrimony that is appropriated
exclusively to the partnership.” 58 Recall the rhetorical argument
given by the Cour de cassation when it turned the société into a
legal person. Though not explicitly, the legislature must have
wanted to implicitly give a distinct patrimony to partnerships.
But Justice Rochon went further. Since the patrimony created
by the contribution will only be used in the interest of the
partnership (article 2208 CCQ) and managed under its rules
(article 2212 CCQ), he seems to see an analogy with trusts,
although this is never explicitly stated. 59 This implicit analogy
leads him to concluding something that, to orthodox civilians,
seems almost impossible: “there does not seem to be anything to
prevent a general partnership, which does not possess a legal
personality, from taking on obligations or answering to them
regarding its property.” 60 According to Justice Rochon, a
partnership is not only a distinct entity; it can also be a debtor,
although it does not have legal personality.
General partnerships are thus, according to him, rights-andduties-bearing units, 61 which have no legal personality. The
question of the holder, or holders in the case of a partnership, of
the rights and duties does not seem to perturb the judge. And he
has an explanation: the new paradigm of the Code, this “objective
theory of patrimony” newly inserted. The idea of a patrimony
without a holder seems to be an integral part of his imagination.
58. (Translated by the author). Id. para. 68.
59. Rochon, J.A. cites Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, La fiducie, un nouveau
sujet de droit?, in MÉLANGES ERNEST CAPARROS 129-143 (J. Beaulne ed.,
Wilson & Lafleur 2002). Ferme CGR, supra note 7, para. 70, n.40.
60. Id. (footnotes omitted).
61. To use an expression taken from Maitland in STATE, TRUST AND
CORPORATION, supra note 23, at 68.
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In fact, to anchor his reasoning, he uses the exact language
used by the legislature when discussing patrimonies by
appropriation: “The partnership's property thus forms an
autonomous patrimony made up of each partner's contribution that
is distinct from the patrimony of its partners.” 62 A patrimony that
is distinct and autonomous; those are the exact words that we find
in article 1261 of the Civil Code of Québec concerning the nature
of the trust, the archetype of the patrimony by appropriation in the
Code. Yet again, the analogy with trusts is never explicitly made.
Justice Rochon, before concluding his reasoning on the
autonomous nature of partnership, underlined that the legislature
gave partnership in the new code the power to sue and be sued in a
civil action under its own name (article 2225 CCQ), which
expresses yet again its autonomous nature. He goes even further: to
ground his conclusion, he reiterates that his conclusion finds its
basis in the language of the Code itself: article 2221, which sets
out the way property should be discussed by the creditors, blatantly
uses the expression “the property of the partnership”—“les biens
de la société.” The inference is therefore clear: the legislature
wanted partnerships to have a patrimony of their own without
having legal personality.
Justice Rochon concludes: All these provisions acknowledge
that a general partnership has an autonomous, distinct and
organized patrimony independent from its partners. Consequently,
it can be liquidated on its own according to the BIA. He dismissed
the appeal.
IV. LE NON-DIT: THE BASIC JURAL CONCEPTS AT PLAY
The power of this judgment lies in what it has left unsaid. The
issue was one of bankruptcy, yet the very nature of a general
partnership was at play and indeed the judge set aside a complete
part of his judgment to discuss the problem, analyzing the legal
62. Ferme CGR, supra note 7, para. 68.
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nature of partnership and giving it a new ground. But, by doing so,
Justice Rochon performed a magnificent dance: never did he
explicitly say what it means for a partnership to be a distinct and
autonomous patrimony and thus be able to have rights and duties,
even if it does not possess legal personality. Never did he truly
invoke trusts and patrimonies by appropriation, even if we
understand that that is where he finds his justification. He did
mention the new paradigm, the idea that according to articles 2 and
915 of the Civil Code of Québec, the Code now recognizes an
objective theory of patrimony; but what does that mean? He did
mention, albeit in a footnote, a text about trusts—La fiducie,
nouveau sujet de droit, as an analogy (those are his words) to
understand how an autonomous patrimony could have rights and
duties. 63 But where does that lead us? Are analogies sufficient to
create a new kind of debtor? Are analogies sufficient to set aside
how the liability of the partners and the ownership structure of
partnership have been until now understood? To come back to the
questions posed in the introduction, what really is a distinct and
autonomous patrimony? Is it, in the case at bar, the same thing as a
patrimony by appropriation? Are partnerships trusts? What is a
partnership in Québec law? To answer these questions, not only
must we look at the basic notions at play, but also the actual
regimes set out by the legislature. Only after understanding what it
might mean to call a partnership a distinct and autonomous
patrimony can we understand the consequences of this
nomenclature and assess its value.
As mentioned before, the only place where we find the words
“distinct and autonomous patrimony” in the Code is in article 1260
CCQ concerning the trust. The story of the Québec trust is quite
particular and has been the object of much scholarly work, its own
juridical nature still being questioned. 64 In reality, trusts and
63. Supra note 59.
64. See Sylvio Normand & Jacques Gosselin, La fiducie du Code civil : un
sujet d’affrontement dans la communauté juridique québécoise, 31 C. DE D. 681.
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partnerships share many similarities with respect to their history,
their relationship with the common law and their juridical
attributes. The question is: do they share the same juridical
mechanisms in the Civil Code of Québec today?
Fundamentally a common law institution, the trust has had a
difficult relationship with the civil law. If we can find it today in
many civilian jurisdictions, it is not without distorting both the law
and the institution.65 In Québec, the close relationship with the
common law called for the trust’s insertion quite early on, and it
has been part of the civil code since 1889. 66 Yet under the Civil
Code of Lower Canada, the law of trusts was not without pitfalls—
the ownership structure of the trust was understood to be sui
generis, as the trustee had ownership for someone else’s benefit.
With the recodification came a strong desire for modifications and
this is where things become interesting: the committee in charge of
studying how to reform the trust proposed giving it legal
personality. According to some, this was the only way the trust
could find its way into the civil law without disturbing the
prevalent order of things, namely the dominant understanding of
person, property and obligation, or the dominant understanding of
subjective rights. 67 Yet, like partnership, this way of understanding
trust was too much in opposition to its common law counterpart:
calling a trust a corporation simply did not get the approval of the
practice. Thus, at its final stage, a look toward the modern

(1990); see also Yaëll Emerich, La fiducie civiliste : modalité ou intermède de la
propriété?, in THE WORLDS OF TRUST /LA FIDUCIE DANS TOUS SES ÉTATS
(Lionel Smith dir., Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2013).
65. For a good account see RE-IMAGINING THE TRUST. TRUST IN THE CIVIL
LAW (Lionel Smith ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
66. On the origins of trust in Québec, see Madeleine Cantin Cumyn,
L'origine de la fiducie québécoise, in MÉLANGES OFFERTS PAR SES COLLÈGUES
DE MCGILL À PAUL-ANDRÉ CRÉPEAU /MÉLANGES PRESENTED BY MCGILL
COLLEAGUES TO PAUL-ANDRÉ CRÉPEAU 199 (Éditions Yvon Blais 1997).
67. See Yves Caron, The Trust in Québec, 25 R. D. MCGILL 421 (19791980).
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understanding of patrimony prevailed and an all-new institution
was created: trust as a patrimony by appropriation.
But what is a patrimony by appropriation? No definition is
given in the code. Only a few clues are provided: “Article 1261.
The trust patrimony, consisting of the property transferred in trust,
constitutes a patrimony by appropriation, autonomous and distinct
from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none of
them has any real right (emphasis added).” 68 An autonomous and
distinct patrimony; the words ring a bell. Yet here, the autonomy is
inscribed in the law and circumscribed: in a Québec trust, no one
owns the property held in trust, none of the people implicated in its
raison d’être—the settlor, the trustee or the beneficiary—have any
real, or for that matter, personal rights in the trust patrimony. The
nature of the belonging and the longing lies elsewhere. The trust in
Québec is neither a being nor a way of being with one another; it is
a new mode of being. Patrimony by appropriation is a new
modality of patrimony.
The notion of patrimony is at the very heart of the problem.
The term, obviously part of the courts’ and legal actors’
imagination, and today part of the Civil Code of Québec, 69 does
not, however, know any legal definition and no general consensus
has been reached concerning its juridical nature. 70 In fact,
according to the Minister’s comments on the Civil Code, the
theoretical questions emanating from the notion were simply too
grand to even try to express them in a mere definition. 71
68. Article 1261 QCC (Le patrimoine fiduciaire, formé des biens transférés
en fiducie, constitue un patrimoine d'affectation autonome et distinct de celui du
constituant, du fiduciaire ou du bénéficiaire, sur lequel aucun d'entre eux n'a de
droit réel).
69. We now find the notion 67 times in the CCQ. More importantly, it is
introduced at art. 2 which states that every person has a patrimony.
70. See Christopher B. Gray, Patrimony, 22 C. DE D. 81 (1981).
71. According to the minister:
It did not seem useful to define the notion of patrimony; in previous
law, the absence of such a definition did not cause difficulties.
Furthermore, the notion of patrimony constitutes a complex reality,
which is difficult to express in a simple definition that would need to
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The juridical notion of patrimony, which knows no equivalent
in the common law, is, contrary to popular belief, a very recent
doctrinal creation elaborated in the 19th century in Germany and
France. Understood as a legal universality, that is an aggregate of
property and debts understood as forming a whole, 72 it knows two
main schools of thoughts. The first one, called the classical or
subjective theory was elaborated by Charles Aubry and CharlesFrédéric Rau, in their Cours de droit civil français d’après la
méthode de Zachariæ. 73 Inspired by German doctrinal work, the
authors developed the theory in order to explain certain matters in
the French Civil Code at the time, mainly issues in succession and
the common pledge of creditors. For Aubry and Rau, patrimony is
intimately bound to the juridical notion of the person. It is a legal
universality charged with the performance of a person’s
obligations. It is both container (the juridical capacity of a person
to hold legal rights) and content (its rights and obligations, present
and future). Essentially the term patrimony in the classical theory
is used to describe the organization of subjective rights (personal,
real and intellectual) and personal liability. This subjective
organization has three fundamental outcomes: 1) every person,
physical or legal, has a patrimony; 2) every person has only one
indivisible patrimony; and 3) a patrimony cannot exist without a
person, physical or legal, as its holder.

respond to all kinds of theoretical questions.(“Il n'a pas semblé utile de
définir la notion de patrimoine; l'absence d'une telle définition dans le
droit antérieur n'a pas soulevé de difficultés, et, par ailleurs, cette
notion constitue une réalité complexe, difficile à exprimer dans une
définition simple qui répondrait à toutes les questions théoriques.”)
(Translated by the author).
In COMMENTAIRES DU MINISTRE, supra note 34, under art. 2.
72. See F. ALLARD ET AL., PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL
LEXICONS—PROPERTY (Éditions Yvon Blais 2012), under “legal universality.”
73. For an English translation and commentary, see N. Kasirer, Translating
Part of France’s Legal Heritage: Aubry and Rau on the Patrimoine, 38 R.G.D.
453, 459 (2008).
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In the civilian imagination, this understanding of patrimony has
had an unexpected fate and some believe that is it impossible to
think in a civilian manner without this classical notion, 74 the
subjective theory of patrimony embodying the trinitarian
architecture of civil codes: Persons-Property-Obligations. 75
The second school of thought, again understanding patrimony
as a legal universality, is the objective or, what has been called in
opposition to the classical theory, the modern theory of patrimony.
Emanating from Germany at the same time as the classical theory
while fundamental questions were being debated around the ideas
of moral personality, and of giving a fictional person the same
rights as a real person, this theory stems from the proposal that it is
possible to imagine patrimonies, which are legal universalities,
without personality or at least as not having personality as its main
structuring feature. 76 According to this theory, that which assures
the coherence of an aggregate of rights and duties is not a person
but the purpose for which it was created. 77 The purpose, not the
person, delimits the container.
There are two different ways of envisioning the creation and
the nature of purpose patrimonies: division and appropriation. The
distinction between the two modes of delimitating rights and duties
74. This doctrinal creation has been understood to be one of the most
important theories of the civilian imagination. See on this matter F. Zenati, Mise
en perspective et perspectives de la théorie du patrimoine, R.T.D.CIV. 667
(2003); F. Cohet-Cordey, Valeur explicative de la théorie du patrimoine en droit
positif français, 95 R.T.D.CIV. 819 (1996); and R. Sève, Détermination
philosophique d’une théorie juridique : La théorie du patrimoine d’Aubry et
Rau, 24 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 247 (1979).
75. Eric Reiter, Rethinking Civil-Law Taxonomy: Persons, Things and the
Problem of Domat’s Monster, 1 J. CIV. L. STUD. 189 (2008).
76. For a good account of the theory, see L. MICHOUD, 1 LA THÉORIE DE LA
PERSONNALITÉ MORALE ET SON APPLICATION EN DROIT FRANÇAIS 38 et seq. (2d
ed., L.G.D.J. 1924). See also F. Bellivier, Brinz et la réception de sa théorie du
patrimoine en France, in OLIVIER BEAUD & PATRICK WACHSMANN (DIR.), LA
SCIENCE JURIDIQUE FRANÇAISE ET LA SCIENCE JURIDIQUE ALLEMANDE DE 1870 À
1918, at 165 (Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg 1997).
77. Pierre Charbonneau, Les patrimoines d’affectation : vers un nouveau
paradigme en droit québécois du patrimoine, 85 R. DU N. 491, 509 (1982-1983).
See also DAVID HIEZ, ÉTUDE CRITIQUE DE LA NOTION DE PATRIMOINE EN DROIT
PRIVÉ ACTUEL 22 et seq. (L.G.D.J. 2003).
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is very important and frequently neglected, division and
appropriation being too often understood as interchangeable, both
being, to the eyes of some, simply purpose patrimonies emanating
from the objective theory. 78 The distinction is, however, of high
importance, and elaborating the differences between division and
appropriation to a purpose might help us answer many questions
left unresolved in the judgment and the Code.
Division of patrimony is a mode of organization that we find in
many sites in the civil law: for example, property exempt from
seizure, 79 property under estate administration, 80 substitutions,81
and the family patrimony82 are all types of divisions. When a
patrimony is divided, the holder’s legal rights are subject to a
different regime of use, enjoyment and distribution. According to
this understanding of purpose patrimonies, a person can hold many
patrimonies, or what have been called small patrimonies or special
patrimonies, and each patrimony is the common pledge of its own
creditors. 83 Even if it questions the indivisible quality of
patrimonies championed by Aubry and Rau in the classical
theory—a person can have many patrimonies—this way of
understanding purpose patrimonies has long been accepted in
positive law as it does not question the vital link that exists
between subjective rights and persons. With division, a person is
still always the holder of rights and the debtor of obligations
divided. The rights divided are only submitted to a different
regime. It is simply as if the person held many containers, each
having their own purpose and creditors within a big container.
78. This text of the French author Pierre Berlioz is a good example of the
confusion: L’affectation au cœur du patrimoine, R.T.D. CIV. 635 (2011).
79. See Roderick A. Macdonald, Reconceiving the Symbols of Property:
Universalities, Interests and other Heresies, 39 R.D. MCGILL 761, 778 et seq.
(1994).
80. Article 625 CCQ and Art. 780 CCQ.
81. Article 1223 CCQ.
82. Article 414 CCQ et seq.
83. In Québec for instance, art. 2645 CCQ, which codifies the common
pledge of creditors, clearly states that the performance of an obligation will not
affect property that is the object of a division.
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What is more, the line between the special patrimony and the
personal patrimony is often permeable, the person holding the
different sets of rights being ultimately responsible for all the debts
he created. 84
At the other extreme of the objective theory, we find
patrimonies without holders, what the Germans call the
Zweckvermögen, literally “purpose patrimony,” what the Civil
Code of Québec has called patrimonies by appropriation. 85 Here
the patrimony is completely autonomous and distinct from one
emanating from personality. The rights, appropriated to a purpose,
do not have any titularies. 86 This way of understanding patrimonies
is quite controversial, 87 as it breaks from the classical theory of
patrimony and more fundamentally the classical understanding of
subjective rights. Rights in this instance do not have titularies but
mere administrators whose prerogatives have been stripped to mere
powers 88 and who are never personally liable for the debts of the
patrimony. With this way of understanding purpose
patrimonies, “un bien peut non seulement appartenir à quelqu'un,
mais aussi appartenir à quelque chose, à un but .” 89 Property
cannot only belong to someone, it can belong to something. The
patrimony continues to be a legal universality where property and
debt respond to each other; yet, no one has title to it. Patrimonies
by appropriation are rights-and-duties-bearing units with no legal
personality, no titularies. Both the nature of the container and the
content here have shifted.

84. See, e.g., art. 1233 CCQ concerning substitution.
85. Article 1256 et seq.
86. For a defense of the possibility, see K. H. Neumayer, Les droits sans
sujet, 12 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 342 (1960).
87. Some defended it. See LÉON DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT, LE DROIT OBJECTIF ET LA
LOI POSITIVE (1901, reedited by Dalloz in 2003); and G. PLASTARA, LA NOTION
JURIDIQUE DE PATRIMOINE (A. Rousseau 1903).
88. On the notion of powers, see Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, Le pouvoir
juridique, 52 R. D. MCGILL 215 (2007).
89. LÉON MICHOUD, 1 LA THÉORIE DE LA PERSONNALITÉ MORALE 39 (2d
ed., L.G.D.J. 1924).
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If divisions can be found in most civilian jurisdictions as
exceptions to the general rule calling for indivisibility, patrimonies
without holders do not share the same fate. The implications of this
understanding of purpose patrimonies are far-reaching, and most
civilian jurisdictions do not even fathom its possibility. In fact, to
this day, only the province of Québec and the Czech Republic90
have included this vision of purpose patrimonies in their law. And,
in the Civil Code of Québec, until the judgment at hand, it was
thought that there was only one type of patrimony by
appropriation, and that was the trust. 91
To fully understand what is meant in the judgment by
autonomous and distinct patrimony, we must turn to the title
dedicated to trusts in the book on property, which the legislature
paradoxically called “Certain patrimonies by appropriation.” Only
after understanding which elements are fundamental to the
constitution of a trust and how it is that property without titularies
can still be the object of rights when in trust despite the fact that no
one holds any rights in it, can we assess Justice Rochon’s new
grounding for partnerships in Québec.
A trust is the result of multiple explicit juridical operations:
first the appropriation of property to a purpose; second the transfer
of that property from the patrimony of the settlor to a new
patrimony that he creates for that purpose; third, the acceptance by
a trustee of his administrative mission. 92 The acceptance by the
trustee of his mission is very important as it is his acceptance that
divests the settlor from his property and secures the beneficiaries’
interest. The trust always has to have an independent and
90. The Czech Civil Code (Act 89/2012 Coll.), which will come into force
on January 1st, 2014, introduces a new institution into Czech private law—the
"trust fund" (in Czech, svěřenský fond). See sections 1448 to 1474 of the Czech
Code.
91. Under the heading of “Certain patrimonies by appropriation” we find
the trust and the foundation. However, foundation can either take the form of a
legal person or a trust (article 1257 CCQ). As such, trust is the only actual
patrimony by appropriation under this title in the Civil Code of Québec.
92. We find the constitutive element of trust set out in articles 1260, 1264
and 1265 CCQ.
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disinterested third party as trustee holding the property. 93
Otherwise, the property is literally paralyzed.
In reality, the trustee’s role in the legal scheme set up by the
legislature is fundamental. It is because of him that the property in
trust is not understood to be without owner and thus remains the
object of rights throughout the duration of the trust. 94 According to
article 1278 CCQ, the trustee has control and exclusive
administration of the trust patrimony. Although holding the trust
property, the trustee does not have any rights in it. He is vested
with mere powers. Powers, contrary to subjective rights, can be
understood as legal prerogatives exercised in a disinterested
manner. It is through his disinterested powers that he exercises the
rights pertaining to the trust patrimony. He is, according to the
code, an administrator of the property of others charged with full
administration, which means the regime and legal obligations set
forth by the legislature in the title called “administration of the
property of others” apply to him. 95 However, contrary to other
administrators of the property of others, 96 the trustee is not an
administrator of the property of another person. He has no “real”
debtor, as no one owns the trust property and the trust is not a legal
person. He is not an agent or a mandatary acting on behalf of or
representing someone else. He has a function that gives him
powers and imposes upon him some legal duties that he has to
fulfill, namely to pursue the appropriation given to the trust
property. Since no one is his creditor, measures of supervision and
control over his administrative acts are set by the legislature: the
settlor, his heirs, the beneficiaries or any other interested party can
take action against the trustee to compel him to act according to the
trust deed and the law. 97 But these supervisors are acting as
93. Article 1275 CCQ.
94. Article 911 CCQ.
95. See art. 1299 and seq. CCQ.
96. Think about tutors, curators, or mandataries.
97. Art 1287 et seq. and the title on “Administration of property of others,”
art. 1299 et seq.
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outsiders, albeit interested outsiders, looking over the acts of the
disinterested trustee. The trustee has legal obligations towards
them imposed by the regime but no personal obligations. His
personal patrimony is only engaged if he commits a fault that
affects them personally in his administration.
The trustee thus holds two very distinct patrimonies, one
personal and the other appropriated to a purpose, which carries on
like a personal patrimony that has no owner, only a disinterested
administrator. The trustee accordingly has two capacities in law, a
personal capacity which gives him subjective rights and personal
obligations; and an administrative capacity as a trustee which gives
him powers and duties and only commits the purpose patrimony.
As Justice Rochon duly pointed out, this duplicity of holding
rights is now inscribed in the law in articles 2 and 915 CCQ: in the
Civil Code of Québec patrimonies can be appropriated to a purpose
and rights can be either subjective rights, i.e. a legal prerogative
that the holder exercises in his own interest, or a legal prerogative
without a titulary which is exercised by a disinterested
administrator entrusted for that purpose. 98 The legislator did insert
the objective theory of patrimony in the code.
V. BACK TO PARTNERSHIP
Now that we have a better idea of what is meant in the Civil
Code of Québec by distinct and autonomous patrimony, a more
profound analysis of the contract of partnership becomes possible.
Are partnerships really distinct and autonomous patrimonies? Or to
ask the question differently and in light of what was just explained:
is it possible that the rights in a partnership are legal prerogatives
without titularies exercised by disinterested administrators? Can
we call partners of a general partnership disinterested
administrators in the regime currently set forth in the Civil Code of
98. F. ALLARD ET AL., PRIVATE LAW DICTIONARY AND BILINGUAL
LEXICONS - PROPERTY, supra note 72, under “right.”

368

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

Québec? Can combining property, knowledge or activities and
sharing any resulting pecuniary profits be enough to constitute a
patrimony by appropriation?
Well, the answer to all these questions is simply no. A
partnership is not and cannot be a patrimony by appropriation. And
the reason is simple: the partners, acting for the partnership, are
interested actors and keep subjective rights in the property held in
partnership from its constitution to its dissolution. If a patrimony is
created, it cannot be one that is organized around the idea of rights
without titularies administered by a disinterested third party. As
such, it cannot be a distinct and autonomous patrimony. Yet this
does not mean that partnership cannot be another kind of purpose
patrimony.
A partnership in the Civil Code of Québec should be
understood as a simple aggregate of partners. It is a contract; a set
of obligations between the partners themselves and between the
partners and third parties. To create the partnership, their
collaboration, the partners combine some of their property creating
a specific aggregate of property that is subject to a different regime
of use, enjoyment and distribution. Each partner continues to be
the owner of the property he contributed to the collaborative
enterprise, yet this property is now charged with a destination and
a specific purpose: the partnership. 99 As such, in each partner’s
personal patrimony, there is a special patrimony—a divided
patrimony, which is devoted to the partnership. All these special
patrimonies, combined, form the partnership’s patrimony.
Partnership is thus a universality of property appropriated to a
purpose, but which has several owners, several titularies. 100
To make it work, each partner is understood to be the
mandatary of the other when it comes to any act performed in the
99. Article 2208 CCQ.
100. Never is the partnership without titulary, though it can now be in the
hand of only one partner (does that even make linguistic sense?!) for a specific
amount of time. See art. 2332 CCQ.
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course of the partnership’s business. 101 Here, there is no distinct
supervisory scheme established by the legislature, because the
supervision of each partner's actions is simply made by the other
partners, the mandators or principals, whose patrimonies are
engaged in the acts of the others partners. They are all personally
implicated in their mutual enterprise. Being a partner does not
entail acting in a disinterested manner. On the contrary, partners
are acting in their own personal interest, their own interest now
being linked to the interests of their partners. As such, they will
together suffer the joys and the pains of their association:
“participation to the profits entails obligations to share the
losses.” 102
All that being said, it is impossible to understand, or even
compare partners with trustees; partnerships with patrimony by
appropriation? Partners in this scheme are at the same time settlors,
trustees, and beneficiaries. They are never disinterested, never
independent, and never a third party. In law, there may not even be
a stipulation excluding a partner from participating in collective
decisions, 103 or excluding him from the profits made. There may
not even be a stipulation that releases him from the obligation to
share the losses. 104 Of course, the management of the partnership
(i.e. the business the partners decided to pursue) can be given to a
third party. 105 Yet the constitution of the partnership does not
depend on this possibility, the partners being the only essential
actors to this scheme.
Ultimately, partnerships are mere personal relationships
between partners. It is a mere contract, as its place in the code and
its definitional provision provide. If there is the creation of a
special purpose patrimony, the nature of this patrimony is quite
particular and should not be understood as a patrimony by
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Article 2219 CCQ.
Article 2201 CCQ.
Article 2216 CCQ.
Article 2203 CCQ.
Article 2213 CCQ et seq.
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appropriation, i.e. a distinct and autonomous patrimony that knows
no titulary and implies an independent administrator acting
unselfishly through powers. Partners hold the rights they have
appropriated to the partnership. As holders of the rights, partners
are solidarily liable for obligations contracted for the purpose of
the partnership. Yet, and this is what confounds the interpreters
and judges: according to article 2221 CCQ, the creditors must first
discuss the property that was duly destined to the partnership; then,
they have access to the personal patrimony of each of the partners,
but only after their own personal creditors are paid. The legislator
here created a particular scheme of distribution of assets. The
assets appropriated to the partnership make divided patrimonies in
the personal patrimony of each partner. The combination of these
divided patrimonies form the partnership patrimony. The
partnership patrimony is an open aggregate of property and
liability, which permits creditors to access, if needed and as a last
recourse, the multiple owners' personal patrimonies.
As such, the partnership looks as if it has a distinct patrimony,
but one that cannot be said to be without holders or autonomous.
The partners are, as they should be, ultimately liable.
VI. THE QUIET REVOLUTION OF LEGAL IMAGINATION
In the judgment, Justice Rochon stated that partnerships are
autonomous patrimonies distinct from that of the partners, taking
on obligations and using the partnership’s “personless” property to
respond to them. According to him, this understanding was
possible because the legislature introduced the objective theory of
patrimony, which entails the creation of purpose patrimonies
independent from legal subjects in the new Civil Code. Because
the language of the Code was ambiguous when it came to
understanding whether partnership meant an aggregate of persons
or an aggregate of property, and because this property was
appropriated to a specific purpose, he did not see any objection in
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depersonalizing partnerships and making the partners ultimately
not liable for the losses and debts they engendered. A partnership,
as an aggregate of property appropriated to a purpose, albeit not
having a legal personality, can, according to him, assign its
property.
Yet, looking at the real nature of a patrimony by appropriation
as inscribed in the Civil Code of Québec and how it is possible for
rights without titularies to still be objects of rights during the
duration of their appropriation, understanding partnership as a
patrimony by appropriation distinct from that of the partners seems
a bit strange. How can the partners not have rights in the
partnership? How can they be disinterested? Is not the whole
purpose of the enterprise to join with others and make an interested
profit?
Depersonalizing partnership is indeed not obvious. If it worked
for trusts, it is because the role of the trustee is quite specific and
framed in a very particular manner. The trust is a patrimony by
appropriation according to the Code. Partnership is nothing but a
relationship. It is a contract. A contract cannot assign property.
Relationships cannot go bankrupt. Persons can.
Introducing the objective theory of patrimony in the Civil Code
is one thing. Seeing patrimonies without holders every time there
is property appropriated to a purpose is another. If the idea is now
part of the legal imagination of Québec‘s jurist, its nature and
mechanisms are not yet assimilated. The idea of property without a
holder is revolutionary and has the power of permitting the
protection of anything valuable without personalizing it. However,
for the idea to work, it is fundamental that we understand the
apparatus behind it, which entails a disinterested actor holding the
rights and the impossibility of that actor ever being personally
liable for the obligations emanating from his mission. If his
personal patrimony is solicited by law, then even if there is an
appropriation to a purpose, what is at stake is not a patrimony by
appropriation but a simple division of patrimony. Both are purpose
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patrimonies, yet both reside on two fundamentally different
regimes, subjective rights and rights appropriated to a purpose.
Forgetting this distinction can engender complicated
consequences, in this case permitting partners to ultimately not be
fully liable for the losses stemming from their collaboration.
Codified civil law stands on the absolute precision of its
language and concepts. When a new concept comes into force—a
new concept that in this case is using a term that is so fundamental
that it is taken for granted: patrimony—it is important to come
back to the basics and understand what is really at play.
Partnership in Québec was a good opportunity to revisit the three
basic notions upon which our law is built: person, property and
obligations. As I hope I have shown, one cannot be understood
without the others. Changing or, in this case, adding a new concept
of property in the Code, based on disinterested management and
not personal benefit, is a major change in our understanding of
what a right is, and most importantly in what law is supposed to
protect. Appropriating rights to a purpose is nothing new, and in
this sense the judge was right: a partnership is a special purpose.
But depersonalizing rights is a whole other phenomenon that
should not be taken lightly. Patrimony by appropriation changes
the whole premise of what we understand as fundamental to our
law and accounts for the distinctiveness of Québec civil law and
society.

